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Foreign Direct Investment and Employment Rights in South Eastern Europe 
 
Abstract 
 
The dominant neo-liberal policy community holds that a reduction in employment rights and 
social protection is likely to promote economic recovery and growth. It has been suggested 
that investors are likely to shun countries where such rights are strong; in contrast, radical 
labour market deregulation is seen as encouraging both local business and multinationals to 
invest. This study explores whether labour market deregulation in South Eastern Europe has 
really encouraged multinationals to invest in the region. We find that the weakening of 
important aspects of employment rights under the law appears to detract from, rather than 
encourage, foreign direct investment. We also show that stronger employment rights are 
more likely to attract FDI when the host country is located with the EU. This finding suggests 
that the complementarities associated with stronger employment rights and more committed 
labour (see Hall and Soskice, 2001) may offset the overall deterrent effects of the greater 
regulation associated with EU membership.  
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates the impact of employment regulation on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows to the South Eastern European (SEE) region. An influential body of 
work suggests that stronger property owner rights is likely to optimise growth, and 
conversely, that countervailing employee rights under the law will make economies less 
attractive to investors, leading to poor macro-economic performance (Botero et al., 2004; La 
Porta et al., 2008; Lehmann and Murayvev, 2009). Some studies, including Lehmann and 
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Muraveyv (2009), argue that there has been a trend towards labour market liberalisation 
across the region, most notably in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, even if, in some 
areas, aspects of Europeanization may have counter-strengthened worker rights.   
The SEE region has been particularly severely affected by the 2008-economic crisis, 
even when compared to the rest of Central and Eastern Europe (Gardo and Martin, 2010). 
Greece, which had borrowed the most from the advanced economies, was particularly badly 
affected (Berkmen et al., 2010). Several post-state socialist countries in the region were, in 
the run-up to the 2008- crisis, also heavily over-reliant on foreign borrowing, with relatively 
high leverage and structural current account deficits (Berkman et al., 2010,p. 8), when 
compared to other former post-state socialist countries such as Slovakia, Poland and the 
Czech Republic (Bordo, 2011).  Hence, a number of countries within the region were forced 
to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), examples including Greece (initial IMF/EU 
loan of €110bn in 2010, followed by subsequent loan tranches), Serbia ($ 518 million in 
2008), and Romania (17.1 billion in 2009), whilst others, such as Bulgaria and Macedonia, 
have come close to needing IMF bailouts (IMF Country Information, 2013).  In turn, such 
countries have been forced to adopt a wide range of austerity measures and, to a lesser or 
greater extent, embarked on new rounds of labour market reform.  For example, in Greece, 
inter alia, the power to set minimum wages was taken away from the social partners, the 
collective bargaining system decentralised, and job security in the public sector weakened 
through a series of legal reforms, which were consolidated in legislation in 2012, and 
implemented as part of the bailout agreement (Karantinos, 2012, pp. 22-24).  In 2011, 
Romania amended its labour code to weaken security of tenure and changed the laws 
governing social dialogue to make collective bargaining more flexible (European 
Commission, 2013, pp. 16-17). All these developments raise the question as to whether 
labour market deregulation in the SEE region has had any impact on the investment flows to 
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the region. In other words, are less regulated labour markets more attractive to investors? 
And, what has been the effect of labour market deregulation on FDI choices?  
In this study, we focus on the SEE countries, which include Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzogovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYRO Macedonia
1
, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, 
and Serbia and Montenegro
2
.  We recognise that there are problems in demarcating the 
countries in the region, and that others could have been included. However, Kosovo has no 
recorded FDI data from the UNCTAD, as it has only been independent since 2008 and has 
yet to attain UN membership. As part of the former Soviet Union, Moldova is in many 
respects more closely linked to the CIS region and is geographically removed from the 
Balkans. Again, although part of the former Yugoslavia, it can be argued that Slovenia has 
converted into a fully-fledged coordinated market economy (CME), with much more in 
common with the Rhineland region than the Balkans (Lane, 2007).    
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 revisits the existing 
theoretical and applied debates on the relationship between labour market deregulation and 
competitiveness. Section 3 provides a brief review of the related literature and states the 
hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the data, variable definitions and empirical methods. Section 
5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 contains concluding remarks.  
2.  Labour market deregulation and competitiveness: theoretical and applied issues 
The role of labour market flexibility in explaining diverging patterns of FDI across different 
countries has been widely debated in the literature. Several studies, including Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2005) and Lehmann and Murayvev (2009), argue that reductions in employment 
rights and social protection are likely to promote economic recovery and growth. It has been 
also suggested that strong employment rights – both in terms of social and employment 
protection – are inimical to job creation, and, through diluting investor rights, to overall 
                                                             
1 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the term employed by many international bodies. The usage of this 
term does not denote any views by the authors on the Macedonian Question.   
2 Serbia and Montenegro ceased to exist in 2006. 
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growth (Botero et al., 2004, p. 1379, La Porta et al., 2008, p. 324).  Hence, investors may 
choose to avoid countries where employment rights are strong.  
However, it could be argued that stronger employment protection means that labour is 
less of a readily disposable commodity, forcing firms to take recruitment and selection more 
seriously, and use existing labour more effectively. This, in turn, may result in increased 
employee commitment, making for higher productivity and greater organisational 
effectiveness in the long run (Harcourt and Wood, 2007; An et al., 2008). Hence, stronger 
employment protection may discourage firms from excessive short-termism and encourage 
the engendering of deeper and denser ties not only with employees, but also with customers 
and suppliers. It has also been suggested that stronger employment protection may engender 
local production networks in denser and thicker inter-organisational ties (Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Deeg and Jackson, 2007).   Therefore, firms may attract investors on account of the 
advantages conferred by such production networks (Whitley, 1999).    
Empirical evidence on the issue is mixed (Kucera et al., 2001; Javorcik and 
Spatareanu, 2005; Dibben et al., 2011).  It should be recognised that there are a number of 
emerging markets with weak or ineffective employment regulation that have been highly 
successful in attracting FDI, including India, China and Vietnam.  However, amongst low 
wage economies, FDI has been concentrated towards those with large domestic markets or 
rich natural resources. Many African economies with weak or ineffective employment 
regulation have been very much less successful in attracting FDI than their Asian 
counterparts, especially in non-primary sectors (see Wood et al., 2014). We argue that an 
important limitation of the existing empirical work is that most studies have tended to focus 
on the impact of relative employment rights at a particular time, rather than exploring the 
impact of their changes on FDI flows. This is a particularly serious limitation given that a 
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study of the impact of employment rights at different times is likely to yield very different 
results.  
Although La Porta et al. (2008) argue that different legal traditions exert long term 
effects that are difficult to depart from, critics have argued that legal origin or legislative 
tradition are not always an accurate guide to employment regulation, and the time period 
covered by their studies is deliberately selective to show less regulated systems in a more 
positive light (Dam, 2007; Deakin et al., 2009). Moreover, many countries have mixed or 
hybrid legal systems with variations on regional lines (e.g. Scotland versus the rest of the 
UK) or in terms of different aspects of law (e.g. South Africa) (Deakin et al., 2009). Even in 
common law countries such as the UK, key aspects of English corporate law owe more to the 
direct effects of specific items of legislation than past court decisions (Dam, 2007; Deakin et 
al., 2009). Hence, the law should be seen as more diverse and dynamic than suggested by the 
legal origin literature, and, which would suggest that assumptions of investor behaviour 
cannot be predicted by legal family (ibid.). This study uses panel regressions to examine the 
relationship between employment rights and FDI flows dynamically. More specifically, it 
explores the impact of employment rights and changes across the SEE region on FDI. In 
contrast to the previous studies that use a single index to measure employment rights, our 
study investigates the dynamic relationship between FDI flows and key dimensions of labour 
market regulation, including rigidity of hours, hiring and firing regulation
3
. Such analysis 
allows us to identify, with greater precision, the aspects of labour market regulation which do 
affect FDI inflows.     
 
3. Brief review of related literature and hypotheses 
                                                             
3
 Parcon (2008) also disaggregates the labour market flexibility index into components, but his cross-sectional 
analysis does not take into consideration the time variations in the FDI flows and employment rights.   
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Variations in property owner and employee rights might not only impact on organizational 
performance and strategies, but also decisions to invest in different settings. However, the 
latter will potentially be moulded not only by regulatory, but also physical resources, relative 
development, the nature of labour and consumer markets, and government fiscal and 
industrial policies.   At the same time, regulatory and government policy choices have 
dominated applied debates, as countries cannot readily change their natural endowments or 
developmental history. 
 
3.1. The determinants of FDI: Existing evidence 
A large body of the FDI literature has focused on the determinants of investment locations. 
Country level studies tend to divide the determinants of FDI inflows into non-policy related 
factors, such as market size, natural resources, foreign exchange risk and economic growth, 
and policy related ones, which include tax structure, investment incentives, labour market and 
industrial relation regulation
4
. This study focuses mainly on the role of the host country’s 
labour market flexibility in determining FDI inflows. Previous empirical studies on the 
impact of labour market flexibility on FDI inflows have tended to use average wage rate as a 
measure of labour costs (see, e.g., Flamm, 1984; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Fung et al., 2002) 
with little attention given to the non-wage aspects of labour costs, which include hiring and 
firing costs.
5
 This study contributes to filling this gap in the literature, through investigating 
the role of changes in the regulation governing the non-wage aspects of labour markets in 
determining FDI inflows. Specifically, we study the impact of labour market flexibility and 
its components, including hiring, firing and hours at work, on foreign investors’ decisions.  
                                                             
4
 See Cooke (1997), Cooke and Noble (1998), Cooke (2001), Yeyati et al. (2002), Nicoletti et al. (2003), 
Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004), Blonigen (2005), Addison et al. (2006), Whyman and Baimbridge (2006), for a 
detailed review of these factors.  
5
 Existing evidence in this area is mixed, with some studies showing that higher wages discourage FDI inflows 
(Culem, 1988; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Bellak et al., 2007) and others, including Gupta (1983) and Wheeler and 
Mody (1992), finding that wages are not related, and even positive related, to FDI inflows. 
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The extant literature suggests that the relationship between labour market flexibility 
and FDI inflows is hard to predict. Several studies, including Botero et al. (2004) and La 
Porta et al. (2008), argue that strong employment rights – both in terms of social and 
employment protection – are inimical to job creation, and, through diluting owner rights, to 
growth. It has further been argued that investors are likely to be sensitive to anything that 
might dilute their property rights, and are likely to avoid settings where employment rights 
are stronger (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005; Campos and Kinoshita, 2006). However, other 
work suggests a positive interaction effect between FDI and the quality of human capital 
(Dunning and Lundon, 2008, p. 317). In turn, this would suggest that there is more to FDI 
than the relative disposability of labour: FDI may be driven by the need for further efficiency 
gains or to access strategic assets, which, in turn, may include human capabilities (Dunning 
and Lundon, 2008, p. 470). 
In looking across Eastern Europe, Bandelj (2008) argues that FDI flows are 
determined not so much by economic realities (GDP per capita, foreign debt and budgetary 
shortfalls), but by the extent of privatisation and the general pro-market nature of the regime, 
and the relative legitimation of FDI (King, 2009, p. 364).  However, many FDI decisions also 
reflect cultural dynamics and the operation of extended inter-personal networks (King, 2009, 
p.365). The fact that the SEE region has been rather less successful in attracting FDI than the 
post-state socialist central European countries may reflect variations in politics and society 
(King, 2009, p.366). Spillman (2009) also argues that in the post-state socialist world, 
informal relations play a more important role in determining FDI flows to the post-state 
socialist world than formal regulatory institutions.  
 
3.2 Hypotheses development 
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The work of La Porta and colleagues (Botero et al., 2004; La Porta et al., 1997; 1999) has 
informed the World Bank’s Doing Business Reports, with countries that have more extensive 
employment regulation being condemned as having worse climates for doing business 
(Cooney et al., 2011, p.84); in turn, this may guide investment choices. The EU’s LABFDI 
report of 2002 similarly suggests that an environment with weaker levels of employment 
rights and protection will lower labour costs which also may attract MNC investments (see 
also Floyd, 2003). 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Host country’s labour market rigidity deters FDI inflows. 
 
However, it could also be argued that knowledge of institutional complementarities 
allows firms to optimise benefits in a particular setting (Crouch, 2005), with different types 
of complementarily emerging in different locales. Hence, no specific institutional context is 
necessarily superior (Hall and Soskice, 2001). As Whitley (2010) argues, firms may be 
attracted to a range of very different settings according to the specific advantages they each 
offer. Hence, as An et al. (2008) suggest, MNCs may be guided in their decisions by rent 
extraction times: while some will seek fast profits and a flexible workforce, others may be 
willing to wait, anticipating that increased employee commitment will yield higher returns in 
the long run. Thus, investing in an environment with strong employment rights may be more 
attractive than the one with weak rights, as stronger employment protection within a more 
cooperative business system can add higher value in production paradigms. In other words, 
higher levels of commitment and optimised human capital development can be achieved by 
stronger employment protection (Harcourt and Wood, 2007).   The Doing Business report has 
been widely criticised for its weak evidence base, and an unwillingness to take on board any 
evidence that does not support its conclusions (Cooney et al., 2011, p.84).  Although the IMF 
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staff claim that it has no particular brief or knowledge on labour market issues, in its 2006 
Consultation Staff Report on Romania, it condemned the country for having an ‘overly rigid’ 
labour market, based on the Doing Business recommendation about ease of hiring and firing 
indicators, and pressed the country to further deregulate its labour market despite the fact that 
reforms have already been introduced after the indicators’ publication (Bakvis, 2006; see also 
IMF 2006, P. 29)
6
. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Host country’s labour market rigidity attracts, or at least does not deters, FDI 
inflows. 
 
To identify those aspects of labour market regulation that are in particular significant 
to foreign investors, labour market flexibility is disaggregated into three components, which 
are: hiring, hours at work, and firing regulation. Again, the relationship between these 
components and the FDI inflows is difficult to predict. Given risks of employing workers, it 
has been argued that if it is more difficult to dismiss inappropriately hired personnel, firms 
would prefer offering a short or medium term contract or being given the freedom to offer 
fixed-term contracts for any task which in turn increase employees’ job security (see Botero 
et al., 2004). Those seeking temporary work may do so owing to the absence of more secured 
alternatives; hence they may be willing to accept a lower rate of pay relative to regular 
workers, effectively lowering labour costs. Therefore, relaxing the restrictions on hiring 
attracts may attract MNC investments. 
                                                             
6 There is much controversy even within the World Bank as to the relevance of the Doing Business index.  
In 2013, the Manuel Commission, commissioned by the World Bank President Jim Kim, argued that the 
Doing Business index was a “poor guide for policy makers”, as it focuses mainly on de Jure (according to 
law) aspects of business environment and pays a limited attention to implementations and customary 
practices (Eurodad, 2013). It also suggested that the task of compiling the index should be moved to the 
World Bank’s research department, so that its recommendations will be more closely founded on 
evidence.  However, the recommendations of the Manuel Commission were not implemented at the time 
of writing; critics have charged that the unwillingness to reform the highly influential index despite its 
weak factual basis reflected political rather than practical concerns (Eurodad, 2014). 
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Hypothesis 2a: Host country’s difficulty of hiring employees deters FDI inflows. 
  
However, it can also be argued that rigidity in hiring may contribute to more 
collaborative employment relations in the long run, enhancing improve productivity. Greater 
difficulty in firing staff means that firms cannot rely on the type of numerical flexibility 
engendered through frequent bouts of upsizing and downsizing. If employees are likely to be 
with the firm for a longer time, more rigorous (and expensive) selection methods are more 
likely to be deployed. Taking more care in recruitment processes would, in turn, result in a 
better match between individual employees and organisations (Jenkins and Wolf, 2002). As 
turnover rates are lower, employers can spread the cost of training and development over 
many years, whilst employees have strong incentives to develop their firm-specific human 
capital (Brewster et al., 2012). Thus, rigidity in hiring may be conducive to high value-added 
incrementally innovative production paradigms and may also be associated with longer term 
relations between firms, suppliers and customers. Such networks may, in turn, be attractive to 
the types of investor who would benefit from such developed local government regimes 
(Whitley 2010; Dunning and Lundon, 2008, p. 679). 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Host country’s difficulty of hiring employees attracts, or at least does not 
deter, FDI inflows. 
 
The potential impact of changes in labour market regulation, such as redundancy 
restrictions, on the costs of doing business in a foreign country can be ambiguous. MNCs 
must consider the flexibility and financial implications of firing the workers.  Restrictions on 
firing constrain the ability of firms to respond to market force changes. MNCs may shift 
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production activities to countries where it is easier to make workers redundant in order to 
enhance numerical flexibility. Thus, a reduction in redundancy restrictions could increase 
FDI. Görg (2005) examines the impact of hiring and firing costs on the location of US 
outward FDI in 33 host countries. He finds host countries with higher firing costs attract less 
FDI from the US. Similarly, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) suggest that labour market 
flexibility in the host country is positively associated with FDI in some Western and Eastern 
European countries. 
  
Hypothesis 3a: Host country’s difficulty of firing employees deters FDI inflows. 
 
In contrast, Dewit et al.’s (2003) analysis shows that stronger employment protection 
may not necessarily hinder a country’s ability to attract and retain FDI as greater job security 
may result in stronger mutual commitment. In other words, as Whitley (1999) notes, higher 
job security means that employers and employees will be more interdependent. Employers 
would have to rely on their existing employees (as they cannot be easily substituted) and 
therefore have strong incentives not only in pre-hiring screening, but also in maximising their 
capabilities. And, as employees do not have to constantly monitor the external labour market, 
they will, as noted above, have more incentives to develop their firm-specific capabilities, 
rather than externally marketable skills. This would be conducive to certain types of 
incrementally innovative production. In other words, rather than deterring FDI, difficulty in 
firing may make the country in question more attractive to specific types of investors (see 
Whitley, 2010).  
 
Hypothesis 3b: Host country’s difficulty of firing employees attracts, or at least does not 
deter, the FDI inflows. 
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There are also two conflicting views on the impact of working hours’ flexibility on 
the FDI inflows. On the one hand, it can be argued that less rigid restrictions on working 
hours give MNCs more flexibility to increase profit potential. For example, if there are no 
restrictions on work hours and overtime pay, firms can persuade employees to work for 
longer hours to respond to a seasonal increase in demand and pay just the same regular 
hourly wage for the additional hours of work.  
 
Hypothesis 4a: Host country’s rigidity in working hours deters FDI inflows. 
 
On the other hand, the World Bank “World Business Environment Surveys” and 
“Investment Climate Surveys”7 concede that if labour rules do not exist at all, or are too 
flexible and fail to offer sufficient protection which result in workers being at risk of abusive 
work conditions, they can harm the development of businesses. Such practice may discourage 
workers’ loyalty and enthusiasm of work, and may be associated with low productivity. Thus, 
it can be argued that more restrictions on working hours may improve the productivity of 
workers. Consistent with this view, Locke and Romis (2007) find that productivity is higher, 
and ultimate unit labour cost lower, in firms that provide better employment conditions 
(wages, overtime, job satisfaction and employee voice).  
 
Hypothesis 4b: Host country’s rigidity in working hours attracts, or at least does not deter, 
FDI inflows. 
 
                                                             
7See “World Business World Business Environment Surveys” and “Investment Climate Surveys”, conducted in 
more than 80 countries by the World Bank in 1999–2000 http://www.gcgf.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/ic-
wbes 
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Following the demise of state socialism, all economies in the SEE region have moved 
to a lesser or greater extent towards more flexible labour markets (Cazes and Nesporova, 
2007, p. 19l; Lehmann and Murayvev, 2009). The deregulation process in some of these 
countries has, as we have seen, accelerated since the onset of the 2008 global economic 
crisis.  However, EU accession and Europeanization is an ambiguous process that brings with 
it both aspects of regulation and liberalisation (O’Hagan, 2002; Scharpf 2002; Thatcher, 
2007).  Van Vliet (2010) argues that, in particular, Europeanization has been associated with 
a tendency towards more active labour market policies. However, it has been argued that this 
process has only partially tempered a broader trend towards lighter regulation of the firm. In 
particular, the decisions of the European Court of Justice, which, in prioritizing individual 
rights, have served to weaken collective employment rights by constraining the range of 
actions open to unions and their ability to negotiate living wage agreements (Dølvik and 
Visser, 2009; Ewing, 2009, pp. 2-4). Afonso and Papadopolous (2013) argue that although it 
has been argued that Europeanization promotes greater corporatist concertation, it appears 
that moves in this direction tend to more closely reflect domestic party political dynamics in 
individual countries. Once more, despite regulatory or institutional shortcomings, low wages 
associated with some EU countries and market access may compensate for any regulatory 
costs associated with doing business within economic free trade zones (see Dunning and 
Lundon, 2008, p. 33).  
 
Hypothesis 5a: Host countries with stronger employment rights attract more FDI when they 
are located in the EU. 
  
Nonetheless, it could be argued that MNCs may be deterred from investing in the EU 
on account of greater - and more complex - employment regulation.  
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Hypothesis 5b: Host countries with stronger employment rights attract more FDI when they 
are located outside the EU. 
 
4. Methodology and data 
4.1. Methodology 
Our empirical strategy involves estimating a panel regression of the following form 
 
,                                  (1) 
where  is the FDI inflows to country i in year n.  captures the level of 
labour market flexibility associated with country i in year n. To test our hypotheses, we use 
four different employment rights measures, which are the overall rigidity of employment 
index, difficulty of hiring index, rigidity of hours index and difficulty of redundancy index. 
 is the k
th 
control variable associated with country i in year n. The control variables 
included in Equation (1) are: EU membership dummy (EU); the interaction variable between 
EU membership dummy and labour market flexibility (EU*Flexibility); an exchange rate 
regime dummy variable, which is equal to one for the floating exchange mechanism and zero 
otherwise; the exchange rate, which is defined as the local currency per US Dollar; perceived 
level of corruption; GNI per capita; wage level; tax rate; manufacturing value added; and an 
education level proxy, which measured as the researchers in R&D per million people. The 
EU dummy is used to test whether EU membership was conducive to attracting FDI. The 
variable EU*Flexibility tests whether the importance of labour market rigidity as a 
determinant of FDI depends on whether or not the host country is located in the EU. The 
selection of the remaining variables is guided by existing studies, which suggest that 
exchange rates (Blonigen, 2005; Taylor, 2008), taxation (Hartman, 1984; 1985), corruption 
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level (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002), wages (Farrell et al., 2006; Parrinello, 2008), the level of 
host market development (Kinda, 2010) and the quality of human capital (Addison et al., 
2006; Kinda, 2010) are amongst the key determinants of FDI inflows
8
. To avoid 
multicollinearity related issues, we ensure that highly correlated explanatory variables are not 
included in the same regression. Finally,  is the error term which can be heteroskedastic.    
  
4.2. Data and descriptive statistics 
Given the significant amount of transition and integration happening in the region and the 
potential effects on economic growth and foreign direct investment, the theoretical 
hypotheses are tested for the SEE countries over the period from 2003 to 2011
9
. Our sample 
of the SEE countries consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYRO 
Macedonia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro
10
.  
We collect FDI data from the UNCTAD World Investment Reports. The yearly FDI 
inflows are measured in US Dollars at current prices and current exchange rates. The 
measures for employment rights, specifically as it affects the hiring of workers, the rigidity of 
working hours, and the redundancy of workers are presented by the overall rigidity of 
employment index, difficulty of hiring index, rigidity of hours index and difficulty of 
redundancy index, respectively. The index values for 2003-2009 are collected from the 
World Bank Doing Business Reports. The index values for 2010-2011 are constructed using 
the same methodology described in the reports. Specifically, the overall rigidity of 
employment index is the average of 3 sub-indices: a difficulty of hiring index, a rigidity of 
hours index and a difficulty of redundancy index. All the three sub-indices have several 
                                                             
8
 Similar set of variables are also used by Wood et al. (2014). 
9
 The starting of the sample period is chosen to coincide with the release of the Doing Business Report. 
10
 Serbia and Montenegro ceased to exist in 2006. 
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components, and take values between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating more rigid 
regulation (see Appendix). 
The EU membership and year of entry are collected from the European Union website 
(EUROPA). The classification of exchange rate arrangements is collected from the IMF 
website. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is published by Transparency International 
and ranks countries “by their perceived levels of corruption as the misuse of public power for 
private benefit”. The ranks are on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). Here, it 
is worth noting that the 2003 Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and its 
additional protocols, as well as national legislation such as the UK’s 2010 Bribery Act, may 
have made operating in corrupt contexts more risky for MNCs, and may, therefore, have 
discouraged FDI. The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (US Dollar) are collected 
from the World Banking Doing Business Reports. The monthly wages (in US Dollar) are 
obtained from DataStream. Finally, the Exchange rates per US$, the manufacturing value 
added and the number of researchers in R&D as per million people are downloaded from the 
World Development indicators (WID) of the World Bank. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables used 
in our analysis. It shows that Romania receives the highest amount of FDI (USD 6,752 
million) while FYRO Macedonia receives the least (USD 342 million). It also shows that 
Serbia experiences the highest level of difficulty in hiring (71) while Montenegro has the 
least difficulty (17). Greece has the highest level of rigidity in hours (72) and Serbia has the 
lowest (18). The difficulty level in redundancy ranges from the highest of 48 for companies 
in Croatia to a lowest of 8 for companies in Bulgaria. When the respective individual 
employment rights (difficulty of hiring, rigidity in hours and difficulty in redundancy) are 
averaged to form the level of rigidity in employment variable, Greece is found to be the most 
rigid country in the SEE region in terms of employment rights (55) and Montenegro is the 
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least rigid country, with an employment rights index of 23. Greece, Bulgaria and Romania 
are the only countries in our sample that belong to the EU. The SEE countries are quite 
similar in terms of their corruption levels. With an average CPI score of 3, the SEE region is 
perceived as relatively highly corrupted. 
Table 1 also reports the descriptive statistics of other potential determinants of the 
FDI inflows. It shows that 4 (6) out the 10 SEE countries use fixed (floating) exchange rate 
regimes. The SEE countries differ considerably in terms of the value of their currencies, with 
the exchange rate ranging from 0.77 Euro per US Dollar in the cases of Greece and 
Montenegro
11
 to 99.64 Albanian Lek per US Dollar. Greece has the highest Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita (US Dollar 21,944), while Serbia and Montenegro (for the period of 
2003 to 2006) has the lowest GNI per capita (US Dollar 1,977). The average monthly wage 
in the SEE countries is approximately US Dollar 671, with the highest (lowest) average 
monthly wage of US Dollar 1474.35 (US Dollar 314.05) observed in the case of Greece 
(Bulgaria). Finally, the average tax rate in the SEE region is approximately 40%, ranging 
from the highest of 47.19% in Albania to the lowest of 29.73% in Greece.  
 The (percentage) changes in indices for employment rights and FDI inflows from 
2003 to 2011 are report in Table 2. The figures indicate considerable increases in FDI inflows 
to the region. The negative signs associated with the average changes in different measures of 
employment rights reflect the increase in the level of labour market flexibility in the region.  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Previous studies show that labour market flexibility measures tend to be highly 
correlated with other determinants of FDI inflows, particularly those related to human capital 
                                                             
11
 Montenegro does not have its own currency. The Deutsche Mark was the de factor currency prior to 
the introduction of the Euro in 2002. After that, Montenegro began using the Euro without any 
objection from the European Central Bank.  
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and innovation (Michie and Sheehan, 2003). Consequently, we estimate the bilateral 
correlations between the different determinants of FDI inflows to avoid the multicollinearity 
issues that may rise from including highly correlated variables in the same models. The 
correlation matrix is reported in Table 3. The 90% correlation between Wage and GNI 
reflects the positive association between wages and national wealth. We also report a 60% 
correlation between EU and GNI. This figure suggests that EU members tend to be wealthier 
than non-EU ones. Correlations in excess of 70% are also found between overall rigidity of 
employment index and its various components. The correlation between the difficulty of 
hiring index and the difficulty of redundancy index is almost 50%, reflecting the fact that 
employee rights are affected by both hiring and firing regulations. Table 3 also shows that the 
perceived level of corruption is highly correlated with GNI (70%), Wage (50%) and 
exchange rate (-51%). These figures suggest that corruptions levels tend to be lower in 
wealthy nations with stronger currencies and higher wages. The remaining bilateral 
correlations in Table 3 are relatively low in magnitude, ranging from (a positive) 47% 
between EU and perceived level of corruption to (a negative) 1.1% between difficulty of 
hiring index and foreign exchange rate.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5. Findings 
In our study, the fixed-effects panel regression is applied to analyse the data. A 
statistically significant Hausman test suggests that the use of fixed effects is more appropriate 
than a random-effects specification for our data. In addition, the use of fixed-effects 
application not only reduces econometric problems arising from autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity (Hitt et al., 1998; Bowen and Wiersema, 1999), but also providing control 
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for unobserved country- and year-specific heterogeneity (Greene, 2002; Tuggle et al., 2010). 
The F-test suggests that the various sets of independent variables included in Equation (1) are 
jointly statistically significant. 
To test whether a relaxation of the overall rigidity of employment index attracts or 
deters FDI, we regress the rigidity in the employment index and other control variables on 
FDI. The results are shown in Table 4. The coefficient on the rigidity in employment 
variables is positive and, in most cases, statistically significant, indicating that foreign 
investors are more likely to invest in countries where employment rights are strong.  This 
could reflect the extent to which there are many low wage lightly regulated economies, in 
intense competition with each other, making it difficult to secure lasting competitive 
advantage. Thus, investors who seek competitive advantages through very low labour costs 
may find themselves constantly being undercut by rivals located in even lower cost locales. 
However, it is also possible to argue that stronger employment rights may lead to unique, 
locally or national specific, competitive advantages in specific areas with higher value-added 
production, which may attract more patient longer term investors (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
The significantly positive coefficient on the variable EU*Rigidity in employment (see 
Models 4, 8 and 10) indicates that employment rights play a more important role in the 
location decision within the EU. Specifically, foreign investors find EU members with 
stronger employment rights to be more attractive investment destinations. Thus, hypothesis 
1a is rejected and 1b is supported
12
. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
                                                             
12
 To control for the possible effect of endogeneity on our results, we re-estimate Model 1 through 10 using the 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator suggested by Arellarno and Bover (1995). Our results 
suggest the significance of the coefficient on the rigidity of employment index remains largely unchanged. 
Further details on these results are available upon request.  
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The empirical results from testing hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 whether reduced scores on 
the difficulty in hiring, rigidity of hours, difficulty in redundancy, respectively, attract or 
deter FDI after controlling for other variables are shown in Models 1 through 12 of Table 5
13
. 
The rigidity of hours and difficulty in redundancy are positive, and in most cases statistically, 
showing support for hypotheses 3b and 4b respectively. In line with the World Bank Survey 
and the explanation of Dewit et al. (2003), but contrary to the empirical findings of Görg 
(2005) and Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005), inflexibility in working hours and firing workers 
implies commitment power; greater mutual commitment incentivises the development of 
firm-specific skills, and may improve the productivity of workers, attracting FDI. The only 
stringency of regulation that seems to deter FDI, as suggested by hypothesis 2a, is shown by 
the negative, and in some cases statistically significant, coefficient on the difficulty of hiring 
index. The results indicate that MNCs like the flexibility of offering a short- or medium-term 
contract, fixed-term contracts for any task, and a lower rate of pay relative to regular workers 
in order to reduce labour costs. However, restrictions on the usage of temporary labour may 
have very different effects on restrictions on dismissals. Specifically, in environments where 
security of tenure for regular employees is stronger, firms may use temporary labour as a 
screening device to ensure greater rigour in the appointment of permanent employees. In 
other words, firms may attempt to compensate for difficulty in firing by the greater usage of 
temporary probationary labour, allowing them to be sure about permanent hires (see for 
example, Crouch, 2005). 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
                                                             
13 Similar results are reported in other models, which contain manufacturing value added and researchers in 
R&D per million people as dependent variables. The details of these models are not reported for the sake of 
brevity and the results are available upon request.   
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Again, we use interaction variables (EU*Flexibility) to test whether the role of 
employment rights on FDI inflows depends on EU membership. The significantly positive 
coefficients associated with the interaction variables in Models 11 and 12 indicate that host 
countries with stronger employment rights (measured by difficulty of redundancy and rigidity 
of hours) are more likely to attract FDI when they are located in the EU. This finding is 
consistent with the predictions of hypothesis 5a. However, the absence of statistical 
significance on coefficient EU*diff_hiring in Model 10 indicates that the effect of the 
difficulty of hiring on FDI inflows does not depend on EU membership. 
In (unreported) tests, we also investigate the impact of employment rights on the FDI 
inflows to the EU and non-EU members separately
14
. Whilst the sign and statistical 
significance on the overall rigidity index is highly sensitive to model specifications, our 
results suggest that countries with higher rigidity of hours and difficulty of redundancy index 
are more likely to attract FDI when they are located in the EU. However, our findings 
indicate that difficulty of hiring is more likely to be deterrent of FDI inflows when the host 
country is located in the EU.  
 With the exception of GNI and perceived level of corruption, which suggests foreign 
investors are more likely to invest in rich countries (i.e. market seeking MNCs) and less 
corrupted countries, the statistical significance of the remaining control variables in Tables 4-
5 is sensitive to model specifications.  Overall, our results suggest that stronger employment 
rights – measured by the rigidity of hours, the difficulty of redundancy index and the overall 
rigidity of employment index – seem to attract, rather than deter, FDI inflows. This evidence 
is consistent with the view that greater job security increases employees’ commitments and 
value-added production paradigms (Whitley, 1999; An et al., 2008). We also report a 
negative association between the difficultly of hiring index and FDI inflows to the SEE 
                                                             
14 Whilst these results are not tabulated to save space, further details are available upon request.   
 22 
region. We attribute this finding to the possibility that some firms make routine usage of 
temporary work as a screening device for those earmarked for stable long term employment 
(see Harcourt et al., 2006) and others use temporary workers to reinforce the position of 
highly vulnerable categories of labour. Furthermore, we show some evidence that host 
countries with strong employment rights are more likely to attract more FDI when they are 
located in the EU. This suggests that the complementarities associated with stronger 
employment rights, and more committed labour (see Hall and Soskice, 2001) may offset the 
overall deterrent effects of the greater regulation associated with EU membership. When 
employment regulation is weaker, complementarities are similarly less developed, and hence, 
the negative consequences of overall regulation are likely to be more pronounced.  
There are certain limitations to this research.  Firstly, all the countries in the SEE 
region are characterized by very extensive SME sectors and the inflow of foreign investment 
into these SMEs may be poorly documented and/or unconventional.  For example, a large 
numbers of Italian SMEs from Northern Italy have forged close relations with Romanian 
SMEs, Whilst it may seem that these SMEs have a purely supplier/customer relationship,  in 
reality, the ties may be much deeper and may include issues, such as equity transfers through 
the transhipment of machinery (Majocchi, 2000,P. 6).  Furthermore, investments by SMEs 
into the region can assume innovative forms, such as “forfeiture”, which seeks to separate out 
local transaction orientated risks from broader contextual ones (McKibben and Pistrui, 1997).   
Secondly, the region is a fast changing one and undergoing not only varying degrees of 
austerity, but also Europeanization. Thus, future FDI flows may follow very different 
patterns.  Finally, any analysis of the consequences of formal regulation needs to recognize 
that enforcement mechanisms are variable in efficacy. In all the countries in the region, 
institutional and regulatory coverage is highly uneven.   Fertile areas for future research 
might include a closer analysis as to the impact of weak regulatory enforcement capabilities 
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on FDI, and on the alternative mechanisms used by SMEs to invest in the region, as well as 
the determinants of investment decisions in such circumstances.    
 
6. Conclusions 
Our findings suggest that employment rights do not serve to discourage FDI. Rather, 
countries where workers enjoy more job security and greater restraints on working hours 
under the law seem to be more attractive investment destinations. We also find that host 
countries with stronger employment rights are more likely to attract FDI when they are 
located in the EU.  Thus, our findings imply that strong pressures to deregulate labour 
markets may have perverse effects, leaving countries embarking on labour market reform 
worse off. As Whitley (1999) notes, greater job security will lead to a higher degree of inter-
dependence between employer and employee and encourage the development of firm-
specific skills and capabilities (Brewster et al., 2012), which would be conducive to higher 
value-added production paradigms. And, as Knox and Walsh (2005) suggest, restraints on 
working time may also make for a more productive workforce. In the absence of such 
restraints, employers may arbitrarily adjust employees’ working day, impinging on leisure 
time and/or failing to pay a premium for working longer hours. This may increase the 
quantity of work performed per worker, but reduce quality. The only area where weaker 
employment rights appear better in terms of attracting FDI is in terms of the difficulty of 
hiring index. This is probably owing to the fact that in certain countries, firms make routine 
usage of temporary work as a screening device for those earmarked for stable long term 
employment (see Harcourt et al., 2006). In other countries, temporary working may be 
widely used as a mechanism to reinforce the position of highly vulnerable categories of 
labour. Firms originating in either context may be deterred from investing in countries where 
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the difficulty of hiring ranking is high for opposite reasons. Hence, ease in hiring may not be 
always associated with weaker employment rights in other areas.     
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Appendix 
Panel A: The difficulty of hiring index is constructed by averaging the scores from the following 3 components 
and scaling to 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulation. 
Component Score 
Whether fixed-term contracts are prohibited for 
permanent tasks; 
A score of 1 if fixed-term contracts are prohibited for 
permanent tasks and 0 if they can be used for any task. 
 
The maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term 
contracts; 
A score of 1 if the maximum cumulative duration of 
fixed-term contracts is less than 3 years; 0.5 if it is 3 
years or more but less than 5 years; and 0 if it can last 5 
years or more. 
 
The ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or first-
time employee to the average value added per worker. 
A score of 1 is assigned if the ratio is 0.75 or more; 
0.67 for a ratio of 0.50 or more but less than 0.75; 0.33 
for a ratio of 0.25 or more but less than 0.50; and 0 for 
a ratio of less than 0.25.  
 
 
Source: Employing workers methodology in World Bank Doing Business Report 
 
Panel B: The rigidity of hours index is constructed by averaging the scores from the following 5 components 
and scaling to 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulation. 
 
Component Score 
Whether there are restrictions on night work; A score of 1 if restrictions other than premiums apply 
and 0 if there are no restrictions.  
 
Whether there are restrictions on weekly holiday work; A score of 1 if restrictions other than premiums apply 
and 0 if there are no restrictions. 
 
Whether the workweek can consist of 5.5 days or is 
more than 6 days; 
 
A score of 1 is if the legally permitted workweek is less 
than 5.5 days or more than 6 days and 0 otherwise. 
Whether the workweek can extend to 50 hours or more 
(including overtime) for 2 months a year to respond to a 
seasonal increase in production; 
 
A score of 1 if the answer is "no" and 0 otherwise. 
Whether the average paid annual leave for a worker 
with 1 year of tenure, a worker with 5 years and a 
worker with 10 years is more than 26 working days or 
fewer than 15 working days 
A score of 0 is assigned if the average paid annual 
leave is between 15 and 21 working days, a score of 0.5 
if it is between 22 and 26 working days and a score of 1 
if it is less than 15 or more than 26 working days. 
 
 
Source: Employing workers methodology in World Bank Doing Business Report 
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Panel C: The difficulty of redundancy index is constructed by adding the scores from the following 8 
components and scaling to 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulation. 
Component Score 
Whether redundancy is disallowed as a basis for 
terminating workers; 
 
A score of 10 if an answer of “yes” and the rest of the 
questions do not apply. 
Whether the employer needs to notify a third party (such 
as a government agency) to terminate 1 redundant 
worker; 
 
A score of 1 if the answer is “yes” and 0 otherwise. 
Whether the employer needs to notify a third party to 
terminate a group of  9 redundant workers; 
 
A score of 1 if the answer is “yes” and 0 otherwise. 
Whether the employer needs approval from a third party 
to terminate 1 redundant worker; 
 
A score of 2 if the answer of “yes” and 0 otherwise. 
Whether the employer needs approval from a third party 
to terminate a group of 9 redundant workers; 
 
A score of 1 if the answer is “yes” and 0 otherwise. 
Whether the law requires the employer to reassign or 
retrain a worker before making the worker redundant; 
 
A score of 1 if the answer is “yes” and 0 otherwise. 
Whether priority rules apply for redundancies;  
 
A score of 1 if the answer is “yes” and 0 otherwise. 
Whether priority rules apply for reemployment. A score of 1 if the answer is “yes” and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Source: Employing workers methodology in World Bank Doing Business Report 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of workers’ rights, FDI and other control variables 
 
  Difficulty   
in hiring  
index 
Rigidity      
in hours  
index 
Difficulty in 
redundancy 
index 
Rigidity in 
employment 
index 
FDI 
(millions 
US$) 
EU 
membership 
Exchange 
rate regime  
Corruption 
perception 
index  
GNI per 
capita (US$)  
Monthly 
wages      
(US$) 
Tax (% 
revenue) 
Exchange 
rate (per 
US$) 
Albania 40 44 17 34 647 No Floating 3 2,868.44 343.84 47.19 99.64 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 61 31 30 41 615 No Fixed 3 3,094.00 734.87 40.56 1.50 
Bulgaria 31 52 8 31 5,145 
Yes  (2007 
onwards) Fixed 4 4,020.78 314.05 43.86 1.50 
Croatia 64 45 48 52 2,765 No 
Floating to 
Fixed (in 
2007) 4 9,508.22 860.97 46.24 5.66 
FYRO 
Macedonia 39 44 27 37 342 No Fixed 3 3,159.78 564.03 40.54 47.03 
Greece 55 72 40 55 2,289 
Yes (1981 
onwards) 
Fixed to 
Floating (in 
2007) 4 21,944.44 1474.35 29.73 0.77 
Montenegro
1 
17 23 28 23 952 No Floating 4 5,386.67 717.52 / 0.77 
Romania 64 58 38 54 6,752 
Yes (2007 
onwards) Floating 3 5,112.00 484.75 33.85 2.95 
Serbia
1 
71 18 28 39 2,238 No Floating 3 4,905.83 551.74 43.76 64.74 
Serbia and 
Montenegro
2 
41 29 36 36 2,774 No Floating 3 1,976.67 / / / 
Average 49 44 30 41 2,548 / / 3 6,603.26 670.96 39.81 24.95 
 
1: 
From 2008 onwards
 
2
: For the period of 2003-2006
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Table 2. (Percentage) Changes in FDI and employment rights during the period of 2003-2011 
 
  Change in FDI 
(millions US$) 
Change in 
difficulty of hiring 
index 
Change in 
difficulty of 
redundancy index 
Change in rigidity 
of hours index 
Change in 
difficulty of 
employment index 
Albania 853.34 17 -56 -5 -14 
(4.79) (0.52) (-0.74) (-0.33) (-0.35) 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
54.00 -3 -63 -1 -22 
(0.14) (-0.06) (-1.00) (-0.03) (-0.46) 
Bulgaria 
-224.36 -18 -70 -26 -38 
(-0.11) (-0.42) (-0.78) (-1.00) (-0.72) 
Croatia 
-494.98 -1 -69 19 -17 
(-0.25) (-0.01) (-0.78) (0.61) (-0.26) 
FYRO 
Macedonia 
308.58 -65 -33 -22 -40 
(2.72) (-1.00) (-0.62) (-0.69) (-0.80) 
Greece 
547.68 -28 -31 -13 -24 
(0.43) (-0.36) (-0.38) (-0.30) (-0.35) 
Montenegro
1 -402.37 -33 -40 -10 -27 
(-0.42) (-1.00) (-1.00) (-0.33) (-0.80) 
Romania 
474.14 27 -65 1 -12 
(0.22) (0.56) (-0.76) (0.03) (-0.23) 
Serbia
1 -246.02 67 -40 -20 2 
(-0.08) (2.03) (-1.00) (-0.50) (0.05) 
Serbia and 
Montenegro
2 
2856.94 -7 -88 11 -28 
(1.88) (-0.14) (-1.00) (0.38) (-0.50) 
Average  372.69 -4 -56 -7 -22 
(0.93) (0.01) (-0.81) (-0.22) (-0.44) 
 
1: 
From 2008 onwards 
2
: For the period of 2003-2006
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
 
  
Diff_ 
hiring 
Rigidity 
hours 
Diff_ 
redunda
ncy 
Rigidity 
employ 
Corruption 
perception 
Exchang
e rate 
EU Exchange 
rate 
regime 
Wage Tax GNI Value-
added 
Research
ers 
EU* 
Rigi_ 
employ 
EU* 
Diff_ 
hiring 
EU*  
Rigi 
hours 
EU* Diff_ 
redundancy 
Diff_hiring 1.0                 
Rigidity hours 0.2 1.0                
Diff_redundancy 0.5
*** 
0.3
** 
1.0               
Rigidity employ 0.7
*** 
0.7
*** 
0.7
*** 
1.0              
Corruption 
perception 
0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0         
    
Exchange rate -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
*** 
-0.2
* 
-0.5
*** 
1.0            
EU 0.0 0.3
** 
0.0 0.1 0.5
*** 
-0.4
*** 
1.0           
Exchange rate 
regime 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.3
** 
0.3
*** 
-0.1 1.0 
     
    
Wage 0.2 -0.2 0.5
*** 
0.1 0.5
*** 
-0.4
*** 
0.4
*** 
0.0 1.0         
Tax -0.1 -0.4
*** 
-0.3
** 
-0.4
*** 
-0.3
* 
0.3
** 
-0.4
*** 
-0.2 -0.3
** 
1.0        
GNI 0.1 0.0 0.3
*** 
0.1 0.7
*** 
-0.4
*** 
0.6
*** 
0.1 0.9
*** 
-0.3
** 
1.0       
Value-added 0.4
*** 
0.2 0.1 0.4
*** 
0.2
* 
0.0 0.3
** 
-0.2 -0.1 0.3
* 
0.3
** 
1.0      
Researchers -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6
*** 
-0.2 0.4
** 
0.2 0.1 0.3
* 
0.6
*** 
0.7
*** 
1.0     
EU*Rigi_employ 0.2 0.4
*** 
0.2 0.4
*** 
0.5
*** 
-0.4
*** 
0.9
** 
0.0 0.5
*** 
-0.6
*** 
0.6
*** 
0.3
* 
0.3
** 
1.0    
EU*Diff_hiring 0.2
** 
0.3
*** 
0.2 0.3
*** 
0.4
*** 
-0.3
*** 
0.9
*** 
0.1 0.4
*** 
-0.6
*** 
0.6
*** 
0.3
** 
0.3
* 
0.9
*** 
1.0   
EU*Rigihours 0.1 0.4
*** 
0.1 0.3
*** 
0.5
*** 
-0.3
*** 
0.9
*** 
0.0 0.4
*** 
-0.6
*** 
0.6
*** 
0.2
* 
0.3
** 
0.9
*** 
0.9
*** 
1.0  
EU* 
Diff_redundancy 0.2
* 
0.3
*** 
0.3
** 
0.4
*** 
0.5
*** 
-0.3
*** 
0.8
*** 
0.1 0.5
*** 
-0.7
*** 
0.7
*** 
0.2 0.3
* 
0.9
*** 
0.9
*** 
0.9
*** 
1.0 
 
Note: significant at: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 4. Result of fixed effect panel regressions on FDI 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Rigidity in employment 0.097
**
 0.173
**
 0.186
**
 0.014 0.184
***
 0.154
**
 0.119
**
 0.021 0.178
***
 0.067 
 
(2.03) (3.19) (3.02) (0.97) (2.94) (2.46) (2.63) (1.48) (3.95) (1.68) 
EU*Rigidity in employment 
   
0.123
***
 
   
0.606
***
 
 
0.083
***
 
    
(3.78) 
   
(43.76) 
 
(5.38) 
Perceived corruption  1.620 
   
3.515
*
 
     
 
(1.28) 
   
(1.91) 
     LnWage 
 
5.724 
   
-10.100 
  
6.628 
 
  
(1.37) 
   
(-1.06) 
  
(1.25) 
 LnGNI 
  
3.557
***
 
   
-1.071 
   
   
(4.82) 
   
(-0.42) 
   EU 2.060 -0.904 
 
-3.337 5.729
**
 7.080 
 
-11.450
***
 -0.771 -0.529 
 
(1.37) (-0.21) 
 
(-1.30) (2.78) (1.86) 
 
(-16.02) (-0.14) (-0.24) 
LnTax -0.722 -2.480 -2.484 
 
1.503 -0.234 -0.782 
 
-2.838 
 
 
(-0.21) (-0.78) (-0.88) 
 
(0.45) (-0.11) (-0.51) 
 
(-0.50) 
 Exchange rate regime 0.424 0.230 0.163 0.277 -0.142 -2.871 -1.341
*
 -0.891
***
 -0.539 -1.199 
 
(0.31) (0.32) (0.42) (0.24) (-0.08) (-1.94) (-2.16) (-3.85) (-0.58) (-1.27) 
Exchange rate 
 
-0.006 -0.097
**
 -0.041
*
 
 
-0.031 0.037 0.013 0.029 -0.128
*
 
  
(-0.10) (-3.48) (-2.06) 
 
(-0.65) (0.42) (0.39) (0.16) (-2.05) 
LnValue-added 
    
1.598 10.138 5.179 1.531 
  
     
(0.67) (1.27) (1.27) (1.68) 
  LnResearchers 
        
1.808 1.473 
         
(0.39) (1.53) 
Cons -5.420 -32.091 -25.658
***
 2.205
*
 -59.060 -163.377 -104.949 -31.936 -48.355 -8.213 
 
(-0.39) (-1.89) (-6.62) (2.07) (-1.26) (-1.33) (-1.45) (-1.55) (-1.62) (-1.09) 
N 53 52 54 71 37 36 38 52 36 42 
Adj. R-sq 0.084 0.156 0.131 0.088 0.107 0.222 0.027 0.598 0.138 0.074 
 
Note: significant at: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 5. Result of fixed effect panel regressions on FDI 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Diff_hiring 
-0.047
***
 
  
-0.038 
  
-0.043
*
 
  
-0.004 
  (-4.14) 
  
(-1.65) 
  
(-2.02) 
  
(-0.43) 
  
Rigidity of hours 
 
0.068
*
 
  
0.106
***
 
  
0.123
***
 
  
0.034
*
 
 
 
(2.26) 
  
(4.64) 
  
(4.88) 
  
(1.97) 
 
Diff_redundancy 
  
0.177
**
 
  
0.183
*
 
  
0.153 
  
0.075 
  
(2.48) 
  
(2.20) 
  
(1.82) 
  
(1.45) 
EU*Diff_hiring 
         
-0.047 
  
         
(-1.77) 
  
EU*Rigidity hours 
          
0.129
**
 
 
          
(3.08) 
 
EU*Diff_redundancy 
           
0.119
***
 
           
(8.22) 
Corruption perception 
2.229
**
 1.498
**
 1.891
**
 
         (2.58) (2.83) (2.68) 
         
LnWage 
   
1.234 7.350
*
 2.071 
   
0.815 4.838* 2.583 
   
(0.31) (2.26) (0.68) 
   
(0.34) (1.98) (1.13) 
LnGNI 
      
0.014 4.836
***
 1.083 
   
      
(0.02) (6.05) (1.26) 
   
EU 
0.225 2.453
*
 1.996 -0.180 -1.875 0.857 
   
2.333 -7.620
***
 -2.687 
(0.67) (2.09) (1.74) (-0.07) (-0.65) (0.32) 
   
(0.97) (-4.89) (-0.82) 
LnTax 
-0.736 0.456 -0.255 -1.717 -1.072 -1.319 -0.552 -0.964 -0.968 
   (-0.19) (0.15) (-0.07) (-0.32) (-0.56) (-0.33) (-0.13) (-0.63) (-0.32) 
   
Exchange rate regime 
-0.127 -0.448 1.175
***
 -0.980 -1.018 0.452 -1.155
**
 -1.272
***
 0.248 -1.251
*
 0.321 0.198 
(-0.20) (-0.34) (3.74) (-1.29) (-1.55) (0.77) (-2.59) (-6.59) (0.48) (-2.15) (0.44) (0.58) 
Exchange rate 
   
0.001 0.088 -0.008 -0.017 -0.018 -0.046 -0.017 0.058 0.025 
   
(0.03) (1.21) (-0.13) (-0.43) (-0.56) (-1.10) (-0.33) (1.30) (0.43) 
Cons 
0.370 -8.024 -9.580 4.050 -45.63
**
 -11.51 8.073 -40.45
***
 -7.047 -1.324 -31.31
*
 -16.98 
(0.02) (-0.63) (-0.72) (0.36) (-3.08) (-1.30) (0.93) (-6.13) (-0.75) (-0.08) (-1.91) (-1.05) 
N 53 53 53 52 52 52 54 54 54 68 68 68 
Adj. R-sq 0.039 0.213 0.122 0.052 0.359 0.070 0.042 0.369 0.034 0.020 0.527 0.087 
Note: significant at: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
